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A LEGEND IN HIS OWN TIME, AND A 




Francis McGovern was teaching at Hastings when he died. When I learned 
the shocking news of his death, I immediately wrote to our Chancellor about him: 
 Francis McGovern was a legend. He deserved to be. He was a legend with judges. He 
was a legend with lawyers. He was even a legend with law professors. 
 As one who has been deeply involved in American complex litigation for nearly 40 
years, I can say that Francis got there first and made more of a difference than anyone 
else in the American legal academy. 
 Francis could take an academic perspective. He was, for example, the person who 
invented the idea of “mature mass tort litigation” that has become so central to so much 
of the contemporary American legal scene.1 
 But far beyond that, he could dig in, get his hands dirty, and make a positive 
contribution to resolving these impossible-to-resolve cases. That’s certainly why judges 
will mourn his passing, for he could work magic to untangle the gordian knots they 
encountered too often. 
 But lawyers will probably miss him even more, since they were the ones entangled 
even more than the judges in the gordian knots Francis could unravel. 
 For the folks (like me) on the sidelines in academia, the loss is of a different sort, but 
a similar dimension. Francis was one (perhaps the only one) academic who could 
actually play a productive role with the judges and the lawyers, but who also spoke our 
language and knew about the scholarly things we hold dear. 
 He will be missed.2 
This immediate reaction may strike some as over the top, but I hope this 
Article can justify it. Some may think Ken Feinberg could claim primacy as a 
mass tort resolution master,3 and surely Feinberg has earned his eminence. And 
he is hardly alone. Over recent decades, a highly talented group of at least several 
 
Copyright © 2021 by Richard Marcus. 
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
* Coil Chair in Litigation, UC Hastings College of the Law. 
 1.  See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
941, 949 (1995) (“Francis McGovern introduced the ‘maturity’ concept into the mass tort lexicon in the 
late 1980s.”). 
 2.  E-mail from author to David Faigman, John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of L., U.C. 
Hastings Coll. of the L. (Feb. 15, 2020) (on file with author). 
 3.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 846, 862 n.70 (2017) (referring to the “‘Ken Feinberg-ization’ of class action practice [that] has 
become routine”); Lynn A. Baker, Mass Tort Remedies and the Puzzle of the Disappearing Defendant, 
98 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1176 n.37 (2020) (“Ken Feinberg may have had special iconic status as a ‘super 
neutral’ of sorts”). 
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dozen neutrals has come to prominence due to their critical role in resolution of 
class-action and multidistrict (MDL) litigation.4 Like Feinberg, almost all of the 
others came to eminence from the practice world. Indeed, there reportedly exists 
a “vast settlement support network”5 that has facilitated the resolution of most 
(if not all) of the most prominent mass tort cases. So Francis might be considered 
one among many, though perhaps a preeminent one. Speaking from an academic 
perch, I find it astonishing that he achieved this eminence despite coming out of 
the academy. Even more astonishing is the fact that, while shouldering the huge 
demands of his role as a facilitator in mass tort cases, he remained one of the most 
prominent and internationally respected scholars in the field. That is why Francis 
stands out even from these talented others.6 
To my mind, what both Francis McGovern and Ken Feinberg (and the dozens 
of others who have gained prominence in this field) brought to the solution of 
mass tort litigation might be likened to the title character in Bernard Malamud’s 
1966 book The Fixer.7 For some that may have unsavory overtones (The fix is in), 
but for me it serves a hugely important role in this context (We urgently need 
somebody to fix this problem). Without people able to confect the fixes on which 
it depends, mass tort litigation might simply be impossible, or at least it would be 
much less effective and a lot more difficult. 
In a sense, then, the question I seek to present is whether to desire or deplore 
fixers on the mass tort scene. For some in the academy, the fixers in mass tort 
litigation are almost anathema, the latest baggage of managerial judging, which 
began to emerge nearly a half century ago, and the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) movement, which emerged in the 1980s. There are many 
forceful reasons to take this position. Indeed, some who have objected to judicial 
procedures to deal with mass torts have gone so far as to invoke Aristotle.8 
Applauding the fixers involves throwing in one’s lot with the pragmatists 
rather than the idealists in connection with mass tort litigation in particular and 
 
 4.  The recent article by Professor Burch identifies some three dozen of the most significant 
“judicial adjuncts” in MDL litigation. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial 
Adjuncts in Multidistrict Litigation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2129 (2021). 
 5.  See id. at 2135. 
 6.  For a similar recognition of Francis’s eminence as a scholar as well as a facilitator (and his 
exceptional personal ethos), see Elizabeth Cabraser & Robert Klonoff, Francis McGovern: The 
Consummate Facilitator, Teacher, and Scholar, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2021, at 1. I also note 
that I had the privilege (though I did not know it then) to be in the audience when Francis made his last 
academic presentation—at an important conference on tort law at Southwestern Law School in Los 
Angeles on February 7, 2020. Then, as in dozens of other presentations I have seen him give, he was 
polished, persuasive, and responsive. 
 7.  See BERNARD MALAMUD, THE FIXER (1966). The fixer in the book is a Jew in eastern Europe 
who is so talented as a fixer that his employer (not knowing he is a Jew) insists that he reside at his place 
of work to oversee things there. Because Jews were forbidden to live in this part of town, the fixer is 
picked up, and he is then accused of the sort of crime involving Christian children alleged in the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion to have been committed by Jews. 
 8.  See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 71 
n.36 (invoking Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in support of opposition to consolidated trials in mass 
tort cases to determine issues of general causation). 
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complex litigation more generally. So, I think that it’s worthwhile to use this 
opportunity to sketch the developments that contributed to the unique role 
Francis played. His remarkable talents were a central reason for his success, but 
various forces created the conditions that called forth his talents. The following 
will be impressionistic, because it canvasses events that have by now produced an 
immense volume of scholarship, but it seems to me to explain why fixers have 
become so essential to mass tort litigation. 
II 
HOW THINGS WERE 
Inevitably, people are tempted to think of the past as a simpler, perhaps 
halcyon, time in contrast to the frenzied complex present. So it is with tort 
litigation. 
The image is of a time when lawsuits were routinely one-on-one contests 
litigated through jury trial in local communities. Professor Chayes summoned up 
this image in his seminal 1976 article introducing the notion of public law 
litigation, typified by the school desegregation and prison conditions litigation of 
the 1970s, which was qualitatively different from what went before: 
 (1) The lawsuit is bipolar. Litigation is organized as a contest between two individuals 
or at least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-
all basis. 
 (2) Litigation is retrospective. The controversy is about an identified set of completed 
events; whether they occurred, and if so, with what consequences for the legal relations 
of the parties. 
 (3) Right and remedy are interdependent. The scope of relief is derived more or less 
logically from the substantive violation under the general theory that the plaintiff will 
get compensation measured by the harm caused by the defendant’s breach of duty — in 
contract by giving plaintiff the money he would have had absent the breach; in tort by 
paying the value of the damage caused. 
 (4) The lawsuit is a self-contained episode. The impact of the judgment is confined to 
the parties. If plaintiff prevails there is a simple compensatory transfer, usually of 
money, but occasionally the return of at think or the performance of a definite act. If 
defendant prevails, a loss lies where it has fallen. In either case, entry of judgment ends 
the court’s involvement. 
 (5) The process is party-initiated and party-controlled. The case is organized and the 
issues defined by exchanges between the parties. Responsibility for fact development is 
theirs. The trial judge is a neutral arbiter of their interactions who decides questions of 
law only if they are put in issue by an appropriate move of a party.9 
According to Chayes, that shift meant that the judge became the central actor 
in litigation. Whether things were usually as simple in the halcyon past conjured 
up by Chayes is debatable. A few years later, Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell 
challenged Chayes’ version of the litigation scene that existed before World War 
 
 9.  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–
83 (1976). 
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II.10 But Chayes’ descriptive account captured many of the stresses about 
institutional reform litigation that captured the imagination of a generation of 
procedure scholars.11 
There is little doubt that, at least into the first half of the 20th century, much 
litigation did look like what Chayes described. Consider, for example, Prof. 
Feldman’s description of trials handled by future Supreme Court Justice Robert 
Jackson before he entered the Roosevelt Administration in 1934: 
With the financial stakes typically tiny, the cases Jackson took early in his career were 
as much theater as they were law. The local community treated a day’s worth of trials 
as entertainment. Court was not held before a judge, but in front of a justice of the peace 
who was not a lawyer. Trials took place not in a regular courtroom, but wherever there 
was space to gather; in a school, a church, or the dance hall of a Masonic Temple.12 
Some prewar litigation may have displayed some of the features that Chayes 
described, but in an era of occasional billion-dollar verdicts it is worth noting that 
the manageable routine litigation of that era probably resembled what Chayes 
described, and that tort litigation of the era was typified by relatively modest 
recoveries. To take a prominent example, the plaintiff in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins13 obtained a verdict of $30,000 after he was thrown under defendant’s 
train, which ran over his right arm, severing it.14 And even then, his lawyers had 
to hide him away to keep him from accepting a low settlement as the case moved 
toward the Supreme Court.15 Tort litigation was hardly a central concern. Much 
of current litigation may still resemble Professor Chayes’ description.16 
And there was much to be said in favor of that method of resolving cases. As 
Professors Burbank and Subrin urged in 2011, American tort law depended on 
such community input: 
[M]any legal norms need community input for the decisions applying them to be 
accepted by that community. Issues such as negligence, intentional discrimination, 
material breach of contract, and unfair competition are not facts capable of scientific 
demonstration. Nor are these issues pure questions of law. Rather, they are concepts 
mixing elements of fact and law that become legitimate behavioral norms when the 
 
 10.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Institutional 
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (arguing that there were parallels to the public law models of 
litigation Chayes described as new that had existed long before). 
 11.  For discussion of the impact of the article, see Richard Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal 
Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 647 (1988). 
 12.  NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 45 (2010). 
 13.  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938). 
 14.  Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1021 (1978). 
 15.  See id. at 1021–22 (describing how one of the plaintiff lawyers got Tompkins to stay with him in 
Baldwin, New York, after learning that the railroad had offered to settle the case with Tompkins for 
$7,500, which Tompkins regarded as an enormous sum). 
 16.  Indeed, a Pew Foundation study in 2020 found that state court litigation has increasingly 
featured claims by corporate creditors against individual debtors, who are usually not represented by 
counsel. See PEW FOUND., HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF STATE 
COURTS 13 (May 6, 2020). Whatever else one may say about such litigation, it surely does is at least as 
simple as the model Prof. Chayes described. 
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citizenry at large, acting through jury representatives, decides what the community 
deems acceptable.17 
Burbank and Subrin were reacting to the ongoing decline in the frequency of 
trial—particularly jury trial—in the era of managerial judging.18 Indeed, one 
might argue that the jury trial was in significant measure a constraint on the 
powers of the judge.19 For the present topic, however, the more pertinent shift 
identified by Chayes was the challenging nature of decrees in public law litigation 
designed to correct systemic abuses, often in governmental institutions such as 
schools or prisons. To give effect to constitutional or statutory commands, judges 
had to design and implement decrees that were not dictated by law but devised 
for the pending case. To perform this difficult task, they had to enlist “outside 
help—masters, amici, experts, panels, advisory committees” that could design 
and implement these structural decrees.20 Furthermore, “[t]hese outside sources 
commonly found themselves exercising mediating and even adjudication 
functions among the parties.” One could say that this experience planted the seed 
for the later involvement of Francis McGovern and Ken Feinberg in mass tort 
litigation. Understanding why this happened depends on appreciating trends in 
tort law and in procedure. 
III 
THE PRESENT MASS TORT REALITY 
The simple past described by Professor Chayes is long gone, at least for 
headline-grabbing tort litigation. To see that, one need look no farther than 
recent headlines. Of course, not all cases make the headlines; as Professors 
Halton and McCann wrote in 2004, the “holler of the dollar” gets newspaper 
attention for the exceptional cases, not the average ones.21 
But Halton and McCann were talking about million-dollar verdicts. The 
present mass tort reality involves amounts that are so large that it’s not surprising 
that they get headline space. To take one striking recent example, consider 
Bayer’s mid-2020 agreement to pay some $10 billion to settle a large quantity of 
 
 17.  Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic 
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011). 
 18.  For discussion, see Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in State and Federal Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 439 (2004), and the other articles in 
this first issue of this journal. 
 19.  See Steven Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. 
L. REV. 190, 207–08 (1990) (arguing that the jury “serves as a check upon the judge’s power in each case”) 
(quoting Patrick Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial 
Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 58 (1977)). 
 20.  Chayes, supra note 9, at 1300–01. 
 21.  See WILLIAM HALTON & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND 
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 167 (2004) (explaining that “multimillion-dollar winners of state lotteries are 
covered far more than those who win only thousands,” and that big-money awards similarly enable the 
press to present court cases in dramatic form). 
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Roundup litigation, which garnered headlines in the New York Times,22 the Wall 
Street Journal,23 and the Washington Post.24 And even that deal left some 30,000 
additional claims unresolved.25 Nonetheless, Bayer shares rose more than 7% on 
announcement of the potential settlement.26 To deal with those additional 
(unresolved) claims, Bayer sought to use a class-action settlement, but the San 
Francisco federal judge presiding over the MDL litigation involving Roundup 
raised questions that prompted the parties to seek to retool the deal.27 News of 
the judge’s uneasiness with the proposed class-action deal caused a decline of 
more than 5% in Bayer stock.28 
The Roundup MDL is hardly the only high-profile mass tort litigation. 
Probably the biggest one is the National Prescription Opiate MDL pending 
before Judge Polster in federal court in Cleveland. The figures bandied about 
regarding that litigation are astronomical, as might be expected. One defendant, 
whose CEO said that “We don’t have that much money,” settled for $250 million 
over ten years and an additional promise to provide its (other) drugs free to those 
in need of the medication.29 The Wall Street Journal reported: “That framework 
 
 22.  Patricia Cohen, Roundup’s Maker Agrees to Pay More Than $10 Billion to Settle Thousands of 
Claims that the Weedkiller Causes Cancer, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/business/roundup-settlement-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/7X77-
SRL8]. 
 23.  Ruth Bender, Laura Kusisto & Sara Randazzo, Bayer to Pay Up to $10.9 Billion to Settle 
Lawsuits Over Roundup Weedkiller, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-
reaches-10-5-billion-settlement-over-weedkiller-roundup-11593017309 [https://perma.cc/6WX5-
WJRW]. 
 24.  Bayer Paying Up to $10.9B to Settle Monsanto Weedkiller Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 24, 
2020, https://apnews.com/article/a12603a80c8238d1f7af3705cfec610a [https://perma.cc/23NA-EPPV]. 
 25.  See Jef Feeley, Tim Loh & Tim Bross, Bayer Isn’t Out of the Roundup Woods as 30,000 Claims 
Remain, BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-25/bayer-isn-
t-out-of-the-woods-on-roundup-as-30-000-claims-remain [https://perma.cc/6BS3-XXFX]. 
 26.  See Jef Feeley & Tim Loh, Bayer Shares Jump on Report of Potential Roundup Settlement, 
BLOOMBERG, (June 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-23/bayer-shares-jump-
in-frankfurt-on-report-of-roundup-settlement [https://perma.cc/H6G2-9ZHE]. This rise in stock price in 
the wake of an announced settlement was not unique. Indeed, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 
(1999), the Court confronted a Rule 23(b)(1) “limited fund” settlement in which it noted the seeming 
effect on Fibreboard’s stock price of the district court’s approval of the settlement. To show the limited 
fund, Fibreboard offered evidence from an investment banker that it has a new worth of $235 million. 
But after the district court approved the class action settlement, there was a “surge” in Fibreboard’s stock 
price, and it was acquired for $515 million plus $85 million in assumed debt—a total of roughly $600 
million. See id. at 850 n.28. 
 27.  See Jef Feeley, Bayer to Alter Plan for Handling Future Roundup Cancer Suits, BLOOMBERG 
(July 8, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/bayer-to-retool-plan-for-
resolving-future-roundup-cancer-suits [https://perma.cc/8GWG-9X6Y]. 
 28.  See id. For another recent example, see Jennifer Maloney, Juul Valuation Cut Over 70% From 
Its Peak, to $10 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2020, at B3. The article offers the following explanation: 
“Once one of the country’s most highly valued startups, Juul has been pummeled over the past two years 
by regulatory crackdowns, lawsuits and investigations into whether it marketed vaping products to 
teens.” Id. One feature of those troubles is In re Juul Labs, Inc., Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products 
Liability Litigation, MDL no. 2913 (N.D. Cal.). 
 29.  See Charley Grant, Teva’s Benign Opioid Settlement Isn’t in the Bag Yet, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tevas-benign-opioid-settlement-isnt-in-the-bag-yet-11595772000 
[https://perma.cc/G2GW-EHU6]. 
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has made shareholders happy and shares are up about 50% since.”30 Another 
opioid maker threatened to file a bankruptcy petition, while others had already 
sought such protection.31 
Meanwhile, another outburst of litigation about talc has garnered 
considerable attention, particularly for suits filed in state court in St. Louis. In 
late June, Bloomberg Legal News reported that one jury verdict in a talc case was 
cut in half to $2.1 billion, with the $500 million award for actual damages 
sustained, but the original $4 billion in punitive damages was reduced to $1.6 
billion.32 
Tort litigation did not involve billions during the era Professor Chayes 
described.33 Indeed, it may be that the first billion dollar verdict to gain national 
attention was a verdict of $1.8 billion (after trebling) in an antitrust suit by MCI 
against AT&T.34 In the suit brought by Pennzoil against Texaco in 1984, accusing 
Texaco of wrongfully interfering with its contract to acquire the Getty Oil Co., 
Pennzoil won a verdict for more than $7.5 billion in compensatory damages and 
$3 billion in punitive damages. Texaco went to federal court, claiming that the 
Texas requirement that it post bond to appeal violated due process because there 
was no way it could obtain a bond of that dimension. The Supreme Court 
eventually ruled that a federal court could not interfere in this state-court 
matter.35 Although Texaco did manage to appeal in state court, all it obtained 
was a reduction of the punitive damages to $1 billion, and it then sought 
bankruptcy protection. Pennzoil later settled for $3 billion.36 
Neither MCI v. AT&T nor Pennzoil v. Texaco was a mass tort case; there was 
essentially one plaintiff and one defendant. One might say that, in that sense, it 
almost resembled Professor Chayes’ traditional one-on-one lawsuit. But mass 
torts began to emerge in the 1960s. Perhaps the first mass tort litigation of the 
current sort was the MER/29 litigation, involving 1,500 plaintiffs who sued a drug 
maker, claiming that they had been injured by the drug.37 At a conference in 1994, 
Professor Schuck referred to “twenty-five years’ experience of mass tort 
 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  See Alexander Gladstone & Dave Sebastian, Mallinckrodt May File for Bankruptcy, 
Undercutting Opioid Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tevas-benign-
opioid-settlement-isnt-in-the-bag-yet-11595772000 [https://perma.cc/E2KU-KH8J] (reporting that 
Mallinckrodt was discussing a bankruptcy filing even though “[a]voiding a bankruptcy filing by 
Mallinckrodt was an important feature” of the proposed deal, and that Purdue Pharma LP and Insys 
Therapeutics, Inc. had already sought Ch. 11 protection). 
 32.  Jef Feeley, Johnson & Johnson Talc Verdict Cut in Half to $2.1 Billion by State Court, 
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-23/court-cuts-4-7-
billion-j-j-talc-verdict-to-2-1-billion [https://perma.cc/3XEN-627J]. 
 33.  See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 34.  See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 35.  Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 36.  See Tamar Lewin, Pennzoil-Texaco Fight Raised Key Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/19/business/pennzoil-texaco-fight-raised-key-questions.html 
[https://perma.cc/7V79-3JXG]. 
 37.  See Paul Rheingold, The MER/29 Story — An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 
56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968) (describing the evolution of the litigation). 
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litigation,” reaching back to the 1960s.38 The biggest mass tort litigation of that 
era was asbestos litigation, which had begun to pick up speed in the 1970s.39 And 
the bombshell that got sudden attention to that mass tort litigation was the 
decision by Johns-Manville, thought to be a highly successful company, to file a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1982 due to asbestos liability exposure.40 Two 
years later, Professor Mark Roe published his highly influential piece Bankruptcy 
and Mass Tort in the Columbia Law Review.41 
These vignettes are only a few that have made the press recently. Why did 
this upsurge happen? How did we move from the simple one-on-one lawsuit of 
the past to the mega-litigation of today? In 1981, Judge Spencer Williams of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California offered one 
explanation: 
 The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed a virtual explosion in the 
frequency and number of lawsuits filed to redress injuries caused by a single product 
manufactured for use on a national level. Indeed, certain products have achieved such 
national notoriety due to their tremendous impact on the consuming public, that the 
mere mention of their names — Agent Orange, Asbestos, DES, MER/29, Dalkon 
Shield — conjures images of massive litigation, corporate stonewalling, and infrequent 
yet prevalent “big money” punitive damage awards.42 
And as globalization picked up speed, use on a national level did not fully capture 
the litigation potential, at least for American companies that could be sued in the 
United States by plaintiffs from around the world.43 
A second strand of explanation has to do with tort law, something of a 
revolution wrought by section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The 
adoption of product liability tort theories produced, after 1960, what Professor 
Priest, writing in 1985, called “a conceptual revolution that is among the most 
dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system.”44 He traced this 
revolution to the academic tort work beginning in the 1930s that proceeded from 
 
 38.  Peter Schuck, supra note 1, at 941. This paper was originally presented at a Cornell Law School 
conference in October 1994. See Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement 
Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 811 (1995). 
 39.  See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 
(1984) (chronicling the rise of asbestos litigation). 
 40.  See Mark Kunkler, The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of the Judicial Process?, 
11 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 153 (1983) (examining the use of federal bankruptcy by the Manville Corporation 
to seek refuge from product liability claims). 
 41.  See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984). 
 42.  In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 892 (N.D. Cal. 
1981). 
 43.  True, forum non conveniens might be advanced as a ground to get these non-American plaintiffs 
relegated to the courts of their home countries, but often that effort was not successful. Personal 
jurisdiction limitations might present insurmountable obstacles for non-Americans to sue non-American 
companies in the United States, however. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 
(2017) (holding that even though California plaintiffs could sue Bristol-Myers in California, other 
plaintiffs from other states could not because specific jurisdiction did not exist to support their suits in 
California). 
 44.  George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985). 
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“a single coherent conception . . . business enterprises ought to be responsible for 
losses resulting from products they introduce into commerce.”45 This doctrinal 
development “generates complicated legal and economic issues—of 
industrywide apportionment of liability, probabilistic causation, and retroactive 
liability—that would have appeared bizarre to a lawyer dealing with defective 
products in the 1950s.”46 
At almost the same time Professor Priest was lamenting the turn in modern 
tort law, Professor Rosenberg was building on Professor Chayes’ public law 
vision of litigation in general to propose a public law approach to mass tort 
litigation, designed to ease the burden of proving causation by employing a class 
action method.47 Although it can’t be said that this approach has swept the field 
as section 402A did, one might say that it has given birth to the notion of a medical 
monitoring claim designed to guard against harms resulting from exposure to 
toxic substances.48 Coupled with the growing national (and now global) market 
for products, by the early 1990s these forces had, in Professor Issacharoff’s words, 
“placed the courts under siege.”49 
It should not be surprising that this burst of activity produced curricular 
consequences. Since the 1980s, law school courses in mass torts have flowered. 
Indeed, that is what Francis McGovern was teaching at Hastings when he died. 
But their importance in the marketplace far outstrips their academic profile. 
There is even a business headquartered in Florida entitled “Mass Torts Made 
Perfect, LLC.”50 That is not principally a story of interest to torts scholars, 
however. As Professor Siciliano put it in the 1990s, “mass torts present few 
interesting or novel questions of [tort] doctrine or substance.”51 Similarly, his 
colleague Professor Henderson said that “the alleged ‘crisis’ that purports to 
justify extraordinary procedural innovations in mass tort involve not the nature 
of the underlying claims, but their number.”52 So we must turn to procedure 
rather than tort to appreciate the developments in which Francis played such a 
prominent role. 
 
 45.  Id. at 463. 
 46.  Id. at 462. 
 47.  See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984) (arguing that the class actions method would 
maximize social welfare and protect individual entitlements for mass exposure cases). 
 48.  See generally Kenneth Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of Limits, 88 
VA. L. REV. 1975 (2002). 
 49.  Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage Awards in Mass-Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 463, 
493 (1991). 
 50.  MASS TORTS MADE PERFECT, https://mtmp.com. 
 51.  John A. Siciliano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990, 991 (1995). 
 52.  James A. Henderson, Jr., Comment: Settlement Class Actions and the Limits of Adjudication, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1018 (1995). 
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IV 
THE SHIFTING PROCEDURAL LANDSCAPE 
Whatever the prevailing reality before World War II, the emerging actuality 
by the late 1940s was that what we would now call complex litigation was taking 
center stage in litigation in the American federal courts. By the late 1940s, the 
federal courts embarked on a study of protracted litigation that led to publication 
of a 1951 study known as the Prettyman Report.53 This report was followed by 
various conferences and, in 1960, the publication by the Federal Judicial Center 
of the Handbook for Complex Litigation,54 forerunner of the Manual for 
Complex Litigation, now in its fourth edition.55 
But as we have seen already, that protracted litigation in the 1950s and 1960s 
was very different from what we would now call mass tort litigation. Very often 
it involved governmental action against large-scale commercial actors. Indeed, 
the antitrust litigation of the 1960s and 1970s came to emphasize “coattail” 
litigation by private plaintiffs following governmental actions, often employing 
the class-action device to add magnitude to their litigation efforts.56 After the 
Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action for securities 
fraud,57 the securities fraud class action came into its own, partly energized by the 
1966 amendments to Rule 23. 
During this period of time, mass tort litigation was not at the forefront, and 
procedural innovation did not seem critical to it. To take an early example of such 
litigation, consider the MER/29 pharmaceutical litigation of the 1960s. That 
litigation began as some 1500 individual damage claims against the manufacturer 
of the drug. But the defendant tried to persuade the Co-Ordinating Committee 
for Multiple Litigation (appointed by Chief Justice Warren to cope with the 2,000 
plus antitrust suits arising out of a price-fixing conspiracy regarding heavy 
electrical equipment) to take over this outburst of litigation as well.58 Failing that, 
the lawyers relied on what one of them described as a “free enterprise” system to 
coordinate discovery efforts even though the defendant would not permit joint 
trials.59 
 
 53.  See Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). 
 54.  See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 
(1960). 
 55.  See FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH (2004), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/mcl4.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ3Q-AJVX]. 
 56.  See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the 
Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000) (examining 
whether coattail class actions are a good model for the resolution of claims of widespread harm). 
 57.  J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
 58.  See Rheingold, supra note 37, at 126. 
 59.  See id. at 131. Rheingold’s description of the relative power of plaintiffs and defendants in mass 
tort litigation half a century ago continues to ring bells: 
The defendant in any mass disaster litigation is inherently well organized to deal with multiple 
litigation. It can coordinate its activities and to an extent even control the course of 
litigation. . . . Merrell [the defendant] was represented at a national level both by Richardson-
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Thus, an early effort to use a new tool of procedure—the MDL Panel—to 
deal with tort litigation was deflected. But as I have noted recently, in the decades 
since, “fairly often torts and civil procedure seem to be joined at the hip.”60 That 
symbiotic relationship came to fairly full flower during the half century after the 
MER/29 litigation wound down in the late 1960s. 
Even before the current era of mass tort litigation, the specter of mass torts 
was already casting a long shadow over the redrafting of Rule 23, which led to 
the 1966 amendments that introduced the “modern class action.”61 The prime 
vehicle for the modern class action was the Rule 23(b)(3) common questions 
class. Within the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, there was vehement 
disagreement during the 1960s about whether mass torts could fit the class-action 
mold.62 The framers of the amended rule included in the Committee Note a 
warning that mass accident cases would normally not be suitable to class-action 
treatment.63 
That early warning occurred against a background assumption that class 
actions—even attempted mass tort class actions—would ordinarily be litigated to 
judgment. But rather quickly the emerging reality of the new world of class action 
practice was settlement, not trial. The original modern class action rule did take 
note of settlement as a possibility but said nothing more than that a class action 
could be settled only with the court’s approval. The paucity of guidance in the 
rule strongly suggests that the framers did not consider this prospect very 
important, a suggestion supported by the paucity of guidance in the Committee 
Note on how the court-approval provision should be interpreted.64 From the 
beginning, then, the class action left judges without mooring on what often—
perhaps most of the time—became the most important question: Would this 
settlement be approved? 
 
Merrell house counsel and by a Wall Street firm acting as “national counsel” in both criminal 
and civil litigation. 
Id. at 124. 
 60.  Richard Marcus, Brave New World: Technology and Tort Practice, 49 SWN. L. REV. 455 (2021). 
 61.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Loser Pays”: The Latest Installment in the Battle-Scarred, Cliff-Hanging 
Survival of the Rule 10b-5 Class Action, 65 S.M.U. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2015) (noting that Rule 10b-5 
“did not truly become important until the modern class action was authorized by the revisions to Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966”). The Supreme Court so recognized in Epic Systems, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018): “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 didn’t create the modern 
class action until 1966.” 
 62.  See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23 – What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. 
COL. L. REV. 323, 334–36 (2005) (detailing these debates, particularly between the Reporter, Professor 
Benjamin Kaplan, and John Frank, a member of the Advisory Committee). 
 63.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“A ‘mass accident’ 
resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the 
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would 
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted 
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.”). 
 64.  The court-approval provision was in FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). The entirely of the Committee Note 
guidance was: “Subdivision (e) requires approval of the court, after notice, for the dismissal or 
compromise of any class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
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The judges awoke to this problem rather quickly. Thus, by 1971 the Third 
Circuit was alert to the risk that, before official appointment as representative of 
the class, the putative class counsel could be put under “strong pressure to 
conform to the defendant’s wishes . . . because . . . a negotiating defendant may 
not like his ‘attitude’ and may try to reach settlement with another member of 
the class.”65 But defendants seeking to settle class actions to put an end to the 
litigation on terms acceptable to them would hardly concede that the case was a 
proper class action for full-fledged litigation and trial to achieve a settlement, and 
run the risk that the judge would reject the deal and set a trial date. Instead, they 
regularly proposed pre-certification settlements, with notice to class members 
that they could object or opt out of the deal. As the Seventh Circuit noted in 1987, 
“when notice of the class action is . . . sent simultaneously with the notice of the 
settlement itself, the class members are presented with what looks like a fait 
accompli.”66 
Gradually, then, the courts themselves developed methods for doing a better 
job of evaluating settlements. They developed a standard—”fair, reasonable, and 
adequate”—to determine whether to approve settlements. At least some circuits 
regarded the judge as a fiduciary for the class members in evaluating these 
settlement proposals that both sides endorsed as a good deal.67 The various 
circuits developed distinctive lists of factors judges had to address in making this 
fiduciary determination. Eventually, the “fair, reasonable and adequate” 
standard was added to Rule 23 in 2003,68 and in 2018 the rule’s direction regarding 
settlement review were fortified.69 
Around the same time, judges began to appreciate that the class action device 
might enable judges to cure some problems with tort law. Even before Professor 
Rosenberg offered a public law vision of class actions to solve the causation 
problem with toxic tort claims, Judge Williams (quoted above about the stimulus 
for the mega-litigation mass tort reality that began hitting the courts in the 
1980s70) tried to use Rule 23 to deal with Dalkon Shield litigation.71 In a 
preemptive strike against unwise state tort law that could permit punitive damage 
recoveries from A.H. Robins to create the “unconscionable possibility that large 
numbers of plaintiffs who are not first in line at the courthouse will be deprived 
of a practical means of redress,”72 he directed the parties to brief the possibility 
 
 65.  Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 66.  Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat. Bank, 834 F.2d 677, 680–81 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 67.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We and other 
courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase a fiduciary to the class”). 
 68.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (2003 amendments). 
 69.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see also Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class Action 
Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903 (2018) (discussing the history of class action reform). 
 70.  See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 71.  For a more extensive discussion, see Richard Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort 
Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859–66 (1995) (considering whether Rule 23 can be used 
to effectuate tort reform). 
 72.  In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 
1981). 
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of class certification of all punitive damages claims on a limited fund principle.73 
He granted class certification, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.74 
Though Dalkon Shield surely presented major mass tort challenges, it was 
dwarfed by “the elephantine mass of asbestos cases.”75 The pressure of these 
cases was sufficient to cause the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, after 
refusing five times to centralize them, to order their centralization in 1991.76 In 
this extraordinary order, it also proposed consideration of a variety of methods 
of dealing with this mass of litigation—a single national class action trial, limited 
fund class certifications, or a global settlement.77 It expressed the hope that 
centralization “will, in fact, lead to sizeable reductions in transaction costs (and 
especially in attorneys’ fees),” and “emphasize[d] our intention to do everything 
within our power to provide such assistance [as developing a nationwide roster 
of federal judges to try asbestos cases] to this docket.”78 
In the wake of the Panel’s order, the transferee court appointed steering 
committees on both the plaintiff and defendant side. After much negotiation—
partly facilitated by meetings at the Federal Judicial Center79—the parties 
reached an innovative solution using the opt-out provisions of Rule 23(b)(3). All 
people exposed in the workplace to asbestos who had not yet sued would be 
bound (unless they opted out) by a detailed agreed compensation schedule, and 
their claims would be handled through that mechanism. The settlement 
agreement was about 100 pages long and spelled out very specific criteria for 
compensation at various levels, but also said that claims would be evaluated 
 
 73.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 74.  In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 75.  Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
 76.  See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 415–18 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
 77.  See id. at 422. 
 78.  Id. at 423. 
 79.  See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The district court’s 
eventual findings and conclusions in support of approving the settlement fill ninety-three pages in the 
Federal Rules Decisions. The opinion emphasizes the amount of judicial effort involved: 
[T]he fairness hearing was extensive and protracted, involving the testimony of some twenty-
nine witnesses (live or by deposition) during 18 hearing days over a period of over five weeks. 
The Court heard testimony from participants in the settlement negotiations, several 
representative plaintiffs, two high-ranking officers of CCR [the defense organization that 
pooled the defense for a number of defendants in asbestos litigation], medical experts, and 
representative asbestos plaintiffs’ attorneys. Numerous exhibits were submitted. The substance 
of the testimony covered, among other things, the decades-long history of asbestos litigation in 
the United States; the details of handling of asbestos litigation in the current tort system; the 
negotiation and operation of the proposed settlement and various objections to certain of its 
provisions; the competence and adequacy of Class Counsel; the medical conditions caused by 
exposure to asbestos and the reasonableness of the medical criteria set forth in the settlement; 
the ability of the CCR defendants to meet their financial obligations under the Stipulation 
through insurance proceeds or otherwise; and the negotiation and operation of settlements 
between Class Counsel and the CCR defendants to settle in the present tort system the 
inventory of pending claims of clients represented by Class Counsel and their affiliated law 
firms. 
Id. at 260. This catalog of the efforts involved gives some suggestion of the value of assistance from 
reliable fixers. 
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according to “traditional tort principles” within the range of compensation 
amounts specified in the settlement agreement.80 These amounts reportedly 
corresponded to actual settlement figures of cases already settled by the 
defendants. 
The problem for the judge was to evaluate this proposal. Operating before 
the 2003 and 2018 amendments to Rule 23(e), which provided guidance for 
judges presented with class-action settlement proposals,81 the judge convened a 
fairness hearing that lasted weeks and included testimony by many witnesses, 
most of them experts of one stripe or another, including a report from a law 
professor acting as a special master to report on whether the payment grid in the 
settlement document corresponded to actual payments is past litigation. As was 
often the case, this settlement proposal raised the vexing question how a court 
could evaluate a settlement before it had decided to grant class certification and 
deputized class counsel to act on behalf of the class. Indeed, in this case the 
proposed settlement was a “prepak”—the parties had arranged it even before 
filing the proposed class action, and jointly presented it to the court that very day. 
As we shall see, that is a situation in which the fixers become central. 
One solution to this sort of problem would be to forbid consideration of any 
class-wide settlement until the class had first been certified under the standards 
of Rule 23. The Third Circuit seemed to embrace that view in 1995.82 That might 
well even the playing field and overcome the problem that lawyers not authorized 
to go to trial for the class could not negotiate a good deal.83 The district court had 
already approved the asbestos class action settlement before the Third Circuit’s 
1995 decision categorically disallowing settlement class certification on grounds 
that would not support litigation class certification. The Third Circuit reversed 
that approval, partly on the basis of its 1995 ruling that a proposed settlement did 
not affect the certification decision.84 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, 
in 1997, rejected this settlement certification in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor.85 
The Court recognized in Amchem that the “settlement only” class had 
become a “stock device.”86 Rejecting the Third Circuit’s prohibition of settlement 
certification in the gentlest possible way,87 the Court nevertheless affirmed its 
 
 80.  Marcus, supra note 71, at 866–68. 
 81.  See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 82.  See In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Lit., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the standards for class certification in the “settlement class” context are the same as in the 
“litigation class” context). 
 83.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 84.  See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 625 (3d Cir. 1996) (“the rule in this circuit is 
that settlement class certification is not permissible unless the case” would have been triable as a class 
action). 
 85.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997). 
 86.  Id. at 618. 
 87.  See id. at 619 (“We agree with petitioners [seeking to uphold the settlement] to this limited 
extent: settlement is relevant to a class certification. The Third Circuit’s opinion bears modification in 
that respect.”). 
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judgment that approval of this settlement was improper. Even in the settlement 
context, class actions had to satisfy Rules 23(a) and (b); being found fair, 
adequate, and reasonable as required by Rule 23(e) did not suffice.88 Despite its 
great detail, the settlement failed adequately to take account of the divergent 
circumstances of the members of this huge class—differences which precluded 
providing the same deal for all of them.89 Moreover, the tort reform impulse 
behind some efforts to settle class actions sought more than the class-action rule 
could do: 
The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing 
regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims 
of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 
23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with 
the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large load [the 
proponents of the settlement] and the district court heaped upon it.90 
Rule 23 might have been amended to provide some additional support for 
settlement class actions, but that did not happen.91 Settlement class certifications 
did not end either, and courts continue to consider them in mass tort as well as 
other sorts of class actions. Some academics continue to campaign instead for a 
flat rejection of the settlement class action, something like what the Third 
Circuit’s ruling endorsed.92 That also did not happen. 
But the larger momentum of mass tort litigation has shifted to the MDL 
arena. From the mass tort perspective, MDL had been something of a sleeper, to 
 
 88.  See id. at 620–21 (“Rule 23(e) on settlement of class actions . . . was designed to function as an 
additional requirement, not a superseding direction.”). Indeed, some of the rule’s requirements, 
particularly guarding against conflicts of interest within the class, “demand undiluted, even heightened, 
attention in the settlement context.” Id. at 620. 
 89.  The Court stated: “Recoveries under the laws of different States spanned a wide range. 
Objectors assert, for example, that 15% of current mesothelioma claims arise in California, where the 
statewide average recovery is $419,674 — or more than 209% above the $200,000 maximum specified in 
the settlement for mesothelioma claims not typed ‘extraordinary.’” Id. at 610 n.14. 
 90.  Id. at 628–29; see also id. at 603 (describing the settlement agreement as “[a]n exhaustive 
document exceeding 100 pages [which] presents in detail an administrative mechanism and a schedule of 
payments to compensate class members who meet defined asbestos-exposure and medical 
requirements”). 
As the Third Circuit recognized in 1986, the unevenness of outcomes through the courts made such 
an administrative approach inviting; 
Results of jury verdicts are capricious and uncertain. Sick people and people who died a terrible 
death from asbestos are being turned away from the courts, while people with minimal injuries 
who may never suffer severe asbestos disease are being awarded hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, and even in excess of a million dollars. The asbestos litigation often resembles the 
casinos 60 miles east of Philadelphia, more than a courtroom procedure. 
In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting the lament of a Philadelphia state 
court judge). 
 91.  In 1996, in the wake of the Third Circuit’s categorical ruling against settlement class certification, 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules published a proposal to adopt a Rule 23(b)(4), dealing with 
certification solely for settlement. See Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 
(1996). After the Amchem decision, this amendment was not pursued. Instead, in 2003 and 2018, Rule 
23(e) was amended to deal with the procedures to be used in reviewing proposed class-action settlements. 
 92.  See Howard Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 
988 (2014) (“It is time to abandon the settlement class action.”). 
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use Professor Resnik’s word from 1991.93 For the first few decades of its existence 
after the MDL statute was adopted in 1968, its high profile cases were securities 
fraud and antitrust actions, often including class actions. Perhaps people should 
have been focused on mass torts during that period also. As Professor Resnik 
noted in 1995, “in the first six years of the MDL, about a quarter of the MDL 
litigations centralized were mass torts. In the following ten years, about a third of 
the classes certified were mass torts.”94 In the wake of Amchem, the emergence 
of mass tort MDL proceedings was said to have occurred because mass tort class 
certification had become more difficult to obtain.95 
For some time, this evolution of MDL was seen by many to be an offshoot of 
the original conception—perhaps even a deviation. The initial informal success 
that led to the passage of the MDL Act, for example, had been in the Electrical 
Equipment cases, and it had grown somewhat prominent in antitrust and 
securities litigation—often class actions had not been so prominent in mass tort 
litigation.96 Moreover, though the possibility that the class action could be used 
for mass torts excited fierce debates in the drafting of the 1966 amendment to 
Rule 23,97 the adoption of the MDL statute seemed to involve no contemplation 
of the use of that statute for similar purposes.98 The upsurge of MDL mass tort 
litigation seemed almost to be an invention of creative plaintiff lawyers and 
transferee judges. 
Professor Bradt’s recent work shows that this perception was wrong, at least 
in terms of the actual expectations of the judicial drafters of the statute.99 Despite 
their low profile, the drafters had high aspirations: “The drafters believed that 
their creation would reshape federal litigation and become the primary 
mechanism for processing the wave of nationwide mass-tort litigation they 
predicted was headed the federal courts’ way.”100 Moreover, even though the 
judicial management movement was only beginning to sprout, “these judges 
believed deeply that control of these cases could not be left in the hands of the 
parties or their attorneys—or even in the hands of federal judges scattered 
 
 93.  Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1991, at 5, 
47. 
 94.  Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 928–29 (1995). 
This article emerged from a 1994 symposium about the lower court ruling that the Supreme Court 
addressed in 1997 in Amchem. 
 95.  See generally Edward Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class 
Action is Not Possible, 82 TULANE L. REV. 2205, 2206–07 (2008) (asserting that “increasingly stringent 
requirements for class certification” had made MDL transfer and consolidation “an attractive procedural 
mechanism for dealing with this problem”). 
 96.  For a general overview, see Richard Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? 
Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TULANE L. REV. 2245 
(2008). 
 97.  See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 98.  See Linda Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013) (referring to the relative inconspicuousness of MDL litigation). 
 99.  See Andrew Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 831 (2017) (arguing the drafters intended this use for MDL). 
 100.  Id. at 839. 
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throughout the country committed to what the judges considered outmoded 
norms of party control of the litigation process.”101 
V 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE FIXERS 
The case management movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and the learning of 
the public law experience of the 1970s, coupled with the rising popularity of ADR 
efforts in the 1980s, contributed to the need for judicial support from fixers like 
Francis McGovern. Initially, the mass tort class action prompted a reassessment 
of the individualistic cast of American litigation. As the Fifth Circuit said in 
upholding certification of an asbestos class action in 1986 (citing academic work 
by Francis McGovern), “the current volume of litigation and more frequent mass 
disasters” meant that “courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and 
priorities of litigation management,” and forecast that “we may be forced to 
abandon repetitive hearings and arguments for each claimant’s attorney.”102 This 
attitude sounds exactly like the attitude of the framers of the MDL statute two 
decades before.103 
So if one puts together the procedural innovations made available by the 1966 
amendment of Rule 23 and the adoption of the MDL statute, one is left with mass 
tort litigation that results in deals arguably brokered by judges, or at least deals 
that judges are required to approve to make them binding. In class actions, the 
judges have a responsibility under Rule 23(e) to confirm that the deals are fair, 
reasonable, and adequate. In MDL litigation, it is widely acknowledged that 
transferee judges regard global settlements as a prime goal, and the need to 
remand at the end of the pretrial phase as something of a failure.104 As Professor 
Hensler said in 1989, “[i]n the past half-dozen years, we have seen a revolution 
in thinking about mass toxic torts.”105 That was when the class action was the 
predominant method; the expansion of MDL might be said to have magnified 
this process. 
In class actions, at least, judges had formal power to review and evaluate 
proposed settlements. The judges’ problem, however, is that they are ill equipped 
to ensure that these are good deals. They might rely on class members to object, 
and thereby create the customary adversarial atmosphere for a judicial decision. 
But particularly when the individual stakes are limited, objectors can’t be relied 
 
 101.  Id. at 834. 
 102.  Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.3d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 103.  See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See, e.g., DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2006) (“It is 
almost a point of honor among transferee judges . . . that cases so transferred shall be settled rather than 
sent back to their home courts for trial.”); see also Abbe Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern 
Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 
1673 (2017) (quoting a judge as saying: “It’s the culture of transferee courts. You have failed if you 
transfer it back.”). 
 105.  Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 89 
(1989). 
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upon. Indeed, when objector status was recognized in the rules in 2003106 and the 
Supreme Court held that class members who objected could appeal approval of 
the settlement,107 the way was open for unscrupulous objectors to exploit their 
ability to delay final approval of a settlement and extract a payoff to withdraw 
objections or appeals.108 
If the class members themselves could not be relied upon, and the parties 
were united in support of the settlement, where was a judge to look? And if 
settlement was a desirable outcome, how could the judge (perhaps acting as a 
fiduciary to the class109) advance toward that goal? The experience Professor 
Chayes described in the mid 1970s suggested a solution—deploying fixers to 
explore and develop settlement proposals.110 Perhaps the first prominent example 
of that sort of effort was in the Agent Orange class action, in which Judge 
Weinstein appointed special masters (including Ken Feinberg) to engage in 
shuttle diplomacy about a possible settlement.111 If that was the beginning, that 
model has grown enormously. As Professor Burch recently noted, in the MDL 
setting special masters have become “an entire industry that thrives upon mass-
tort settlements.”112 
Mass tort litigation is increasingly dependent upon MDL centralization. As 
Dean Klonoff has observed, “the entire success or failure of an entire category of 
litigation may turn on whether the cases are centralized in an MDL.”113 Professor 
Noll proposes that “MDL is not simply a super-sized version of the litigation that 
 
 106.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court 
approval.”). 
 107.  See Devlin v. Scardaletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (holding “class members [are] allowed to appeal 
the approval of a settlement when they have objected at the fairness hearing”). 
 108.  In the 2018 amendments to Rule 23(e)(5), an effort was made to prevent or curtail this activity 
by forbidding such payoffs unless the district court that approved the settlement also approved the payoff. 
 109.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 110.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 111.  For a thorough examination of this settlement promotion effort, see PETER SCHUCK, AGENT 
ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986). For an examination of the lessons for procedure from that book, see Richard 
Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987). 
Interestingly, Judge Weinstein had prior experience with a special master in the sort of litigation that 
Professor Chayes was describing in his 1976 article at the very time Chayes was writing his article. In 
1972, students at a public Coney Island junior high school sued to desegregate the school. After a long 
trial, Judge Weinstein held that illegal discrimination had occurred. But the academic segregation 
appeared closely tied to residential segregation. So, the judge appointed his former Columbia Law School 
colleague Professor Curtis Berger, a specialist in urban housing matters, to be a special master 
investigating ways to counter the residential segregation. See Curtis Berger, Away From the Courthouse 
and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978). Berger submitted a 
report, but the judge did not adopt the master plan he proposed, leaving him “initially angry and 
resentful.” Id. at 733. Later, his attitude subsided, in part because he realized that implementing his plan 
would have required that someone “monitor every detail of the plan’s execution,” an undertaking that 
“would have meant a five-year involvement by the court and its delegate in every aspect of a massive real 
estate development.” Id. at 735. At least this experience, then, would not have made the judge 
enthusiastic about employing special masters in the way Chayes described. 
 112.  Burch & Williams, supra note 4, at 2224. 
 113.  Robert Klonoff, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: The Virtues of Unfettered 
Discretion, 89 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4). 
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takes place every day in federal court, but a form of public administration that 
blends tools of ordinary litigation with tools of institutional design more 
commonly found in programs such as Social Security.”114 This sounds strikingly 
like what Professor Kaplan (author of the 1966 Rule 23 amendments) said more 
than 50 years ago about class actions. He observed that “[t]here are some who 
are repelled by these massive, complex, unconventional lawsuits because they call 
for so much judicial initiative and management.”115 The critics then argued that 
“it all belongs not to the courts but to administrative agencies.”116 As Professor 
Noll suggests, perhaps MDL is the 21st century vehicle for judicial agency action. 
But judges are not administrative agencies, and they don’t have staffs of 
experts and assistants to implement administrative policy. In place of that, judges 
in institutional reform litigation of necessity had to rely on outside assistance. So 
also, in mass tort litigation—both MDL and class action cases—judges have 
followed the lead of Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation and enlisted 
outside support. Indeed, one can even see it as a return to an early American 
model. Professor Kessler’s recent book traces the evolution of evidence gathering 
in the New York courts in the first half of the 19th century, finding that initially 
they aspired (on the model of the Courts of Equity in England) to control that 
process, but that toward mid-century the lawyers were able to take over in part 
because the judges simply did not have the personnel to do the evidence-
gathering.117 The limits on judicial capacity (as described by Professor Chayes118) 
may be the most important considerations. 
While recognizing that such outsiders were “once the workhorses for 
managing institutional reform outside the court context,”119 Professor Burch 
criticizes this reliance on outsiders in mass tort litigation. To a significant extent, 
her criticisms build on the critique Professor Resnik offered regarding 
managerial judging in 1982.120 There are valid concerns about the role of these 
recruits (or volunteers, one might better say, for they often are very well paid).121 
Professor Burch’s recent article effectively raises these concerns, largely 
along the lines that were first raised when judicial management became 
widespread in the 1980s.122 For one thing, there is a risk of creating a 
 
 114.  David Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 407 (2019). 
 115.  Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 BOS. COL. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497, 500 (1969). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See AMALIA KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL CULTURE, 1800–1877 86–107 (2017) (describing the shift in the New York 
Court of Chancery from reliance on testimony taken by court masters to live testimony taken by 
adversarial lawyers). 
 118.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 119.  Burch & Williams, supra note 4, at 2139. 
 120.  See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
 121.  For a very thoughtful examination on this subject from the mid-1980s, see Wayne Brazil, Special 
Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 
(1986). 
 122.  See Burch & Williams, supra note 4, at 2140-41. 
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“bureaucratic judiciary.”123 Of course, to the extent mass tort litigation should be 
regarded as more akin to bureaucratic engagement than ordinary adjudication,124 
that may miss the mark in Professor Noll’s view. Additionally, these tailored 
procedures have been challenged as ad hoc, and therefore a deviation from the 
commitment of the Federal Rules to trans-substantive procedure—another 
hobby horse since the 1980s.125 At least with regard to MDL mass tort litigation, 
Professor Noll has responded that ad hoc procedure is central to the design of 
section 1407 and MDL’s ability to resolve complex litigation.126 
All in all, the current debate therefore prompts a distinct sense of déjà vu for 
those who have been observing the academic scene over the past few decades. 
There can be no denying that the concerns raised are genuine. Just as worries 
about using Rule 23 as a tool to modify or side-step otherwise applicable tort law 
is a genuine concern,127 so also is it somewhat unnerving to contemplate recruits 
from the private sector designing substitutes for tort law rules. That sense of 
alarm can rise, compared to arrangements overseen by Article III judges, because 
the elite cadre of people like Francis McGovern who are at the forefront of this 
activity might desire to please the hiring lawyers in hopes of getting further 
assignments.128 Even with judges, there are legitimate concerns about incurring 
judicial displeasure.129 
The response to these overall concerns about managerial judging has been 
pragmatic, not theoretical. Thus, responding to Professor Resnik in the 1980s, 
Chief Judge Peckham of the Northern District of California, a prime advocate of 
case management, argued “that our adversarial system has run amok and that the 
movement toward judicial oversight represents an effort to preserve the best 
qualities of that system.”130 That pragmatic orientation also explains the 
judiciary’s receptivity to highly qualified judicial adjuncts like Francis McGovern. 
As the Committee Note to the 2018 amendments to Rule 23(e) observes 
concerning the judge’s responsibility to determine whether a proposed class-
action settlement was negotiated in a proper manner, “the involvement of a 
neutral or court-affiliated mediator or facilitator in those negotiations may bear 
on whether they were conducted in a manner that would protect and further the 
 
 123.  See Resnik, supra note 120, at 437; see also Owen Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 
92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983). 
 124.  See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 125.  For discussion, see Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects of Procedural 
Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 776–79 (1993) (discussing “The Trans-substantivity Tangle”). 
 126.  See Noll, supra n.114, at 409; see also Pamela Bookman & David Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017) (offering additional thoughts about ad hoc procedure). 
 127.  See supra text accompanying notes 71–73; 91. 
 128.  See Burch & Williams, supra note 4, at 2145–46. 
 129.  See Resnik, supra note 120, at 425 (referring to the risk “litigants who incur the [managerial] 
judge’s displeasure may suffer judicial hostility or even vengeance with little hope of relief”). 
 130.  Robert Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage 
Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 265 (1985); see also 
Richard Marcus, The New Role of American Judges: Reining in the American Litigator, 27 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 3 (2003) (noting the role of judges in the adversarial system). 
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class interests.”131 It is not surprising that, confronted with such tasks as 
evaluating the fairness of class action (or MDL) settlements, judges would 
appreciate the involvement of “super neutrals.”132 
If the involvement of fixers like Francis McGovern would reassure judges, 
why would the parties favor involving them (often at significant expense)? One 
piece of evidence of lawyers’ support for involvement is the 2019 adoption by the 
ABA of a resolution providing guidelines urging that appointment of special 
masters become “an accepted part of judicial administration in complex 
litigation.”133 A thoughtful recent article by Professor Baker sheds light on this 
impulse and underscores the pragmatic considerations that may be central to it. 
Addressing mass tort settlements of inventory claims (bundles of claims 
represented by the same lawyer or law firm) for a lump sum amount, she focuses 
on why involving special masters is often a feature of the allocation of settlement 
funds among claimants. 
Professor Baker’s initial perplexity was about the disappearing defendant 
feature of such inventory settlements—the defendant drops out of the picture 
once the deal is struck and eschews any interest in the allocation of the overall 
settlement proceeds among the plaintiff firm’s clients. That’s understandable in 
the sense that the defendant mainly wants to put the litigation in the rear view 
mirror.134 But the defendant may affirmatively want the allocation to be done by 
somebody other than the plaintiff lawyer.135 In part, that may reassure the settling 
defendant that if something goes awry in the administration of the fund it will not 
be sued or the claimants will seek to have it set aside.136 Moreover, since the 
claimants normally may refuse to participate in the settlement, the defendant 
may hope the involvement of a master will deter “opt outs.”137 
Professor Baker also examines why plaintiff counsel would welcome the 
involvement of a special master to determine settlement allocation. One reason 
is that counsel may believe that the involvement of a master protects them from 
liability for the allocation.138 Another is that if the lump sum settlement involves 
clients represented by different lawyers or law firms, having a special master 
 
 131.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) 2018 amendments Committee Note. 
 132.  See Baker, supra note 3, at 1165 n.37. 
 133.  See Am. B. Ass’n, Resolutions with Reports to the House of Delegates, Res. 100 (Jan. 2019). 
 134.  “[T]he defendant has no reason to care about the allocation of the total settlement fund among 
the covered claimants. Its sole concern is to obtain as much closure as possible without in effect funding 
a continuing war against itself.” Baker, supra note 3, at 1167. What’s more, getting into the allocation of 
the settlement funds would require extra work, as “defendant would need to review and analyze the 
relevant medical records and proof of use for each of the covered claimants in order to apply the 
allocation formula to the facts of each claimant’s claim.” Id. 
 135.  “Sometimes the defendant will require a provision in the settlement agreement mandating that 
plaintiffs’ counsel retain an allocation special master.” Id. at 1173. 
 136.  Id. at 1174–75. 
 137.  See id. at 1173 (“It is also possible that the defendant believes that the plaintiffs each will 
consider their settlement offers to be more ‘legitimate’ in some way, or more ‘fair,’ if they’re determined 
by a special master rather than by plaintiffs’ counsel”); see also id. at 1175–76. 
 138.  See id. at 1177–78. As Professor Baker says, this attitude seems to be wrong on the law. 
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involved can effectively avoid conflict between the firms or their clients.139 
Additionally, in crass terms, counsel may be able to offload the task of working 
up the information on each claimant needed to apply the agreed formula.140 
And the court can play a role in making this arrangement work by appointing 
the special master: 
 The benefits to the individual claimants, the defendants, and plaintiffs’ counsel of the 
special master being formally appointed by a court are an enhanced version of the same 
benefits that each receives when a special master allocates the settlement fund but is 
not formally appointed by a court. That is, to the extent a lump-sum settlement fund 
allocation determined by a special master is viewed by the claimants as more 
“legitimate” and more “fair” than an allocation determined by plaintiffs’ counsel, the 
claimants sense of the legitimacy and fairness of the allocation may be enhanced even 
further when the special master has been appointed by the court.141 
All of this—like the managerial judging movement more generally—is 
intensely pragmatic rather than focused on first principles. In varying ways, that’s 
been the nature of the debate about managerial judging for the last several 
decades. This Article is no place to try to resolve that debate. But if one gives 
weight to the pragmatic reasons for involving court adjuncts, it becomes apparent 
why Francis McGovern will be missed. 
Even for academics, Professor McGovern offered special qualities. To 
demonstrate that, one need look no further than his article for the Yale Law 
School conference on judicial case management in 1985.142 This article built on 
his already substantial experience as a special master in complex litigation as part 
of what he conceived as “the first of a planned series of article designed to expand 
the analytic literature describing new case management techniques.”143 Along the 
way he exhibits a familiarity with a breathtaking range of scholarship, including 
works by Ronald Dworkin, Marc Galanter, Lon Fuller, Richard Abel, Richard 
Posner, Jerry Mashaw, and many others.144 He recognizes that “procedures are 
rarely value-neutral, whether or not we believe that they should be.”145 He 
cautions that “overallegiance to traditional methods of dispute resolution can 
create substantial barriers to effective resolution of complex disputes,”146 ending 
with a clarion call: 
I argue that efforts to improve dispute resolution practices . . . should be supported. 
Flexibility should be given to decisionmakers who, looking at a lawsuit ex ante, determine 
 
 139.  See id. at 1179 (“[T]he special master may be uniquely useful in expeditiously reconciling 
disagreements among the various plaintiffs’ firms regarding which claim characteristics will be given how 
much weight in the categorization and valuation process.”). 
 140.  See id. at 1179–80. 
 141.  Id. at 1181. 
 142.  See Francis McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach to Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986). 
 143.  Id. at 441. Unfortunately, it does not appear that McGovern entirely realized this goal. For 
example, he cites an unpublished manuscript entitled “Measuring Procedural Change (1986)” that was 
seemingly never published. See id. at 452 n.48. 
 144.  See id. at 440–56. 
 145.  Id. at 450. 
 146.  Id. at 491. 
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that reasonable men would agree that the net benefits from an alternative approach exceed 
those of the existing system. Armed with principles, methodology, exuberant skepticism, 
and an openness to public scrutiny, the movement toward managerial judging and 
alternative dispute resolution can assist our transition into the next era of the 
administration of justice.147 
Even those academics suspicious of more active judicial management should 
support McGovern’s goal. That academic reaction explains to me why the 
academics mourn his passing. 
VI 
CONCLUSION—IN PRAISE OF PRAGMATISTS 
Perhaps what the fixers manage to do for the judges and the lawyers should 
really be controlled and directed by legislators or other actors. To the extent the 
proceduralists end up being critical players in the mix, one might be tempted to 
agree with Jack Coffee: “Just as war is too important to be left to generals, civil 
procedure—with apologies to Clemanceau—is too important to be left to 
proceduralists.”148 Maybe one could add that mass tort litigation is too important 
to leave to the judges. After all, the inclination of contemporary civil procedure 
is toward judicial discretion.149 
But Francis McGovern would likely not sign onto this critique of the project 
to which he devoted a considerable portion of his life. Introducing a symposium 
issue in this publication over 30 years ago, he noted a need “to develop a cottage 
industry of experts.”150 As he noted a quarter century ago, we properly rely on 
“the amazingly adaptive and recuperative powers of the common-law tort 
system.”151 That is where the fixers become critical. As Professor Rabin has 
noted, “the dominant tension in achieving a satisfactory resolution of mass tort 
cases has been—and continues to be—a tension between our continuing impulse 
to do individual justice and in a more modern compensation-driven conception 
of collective justice.”152 
From this perspective, one may be inclined to agree with the rather rueful 
comment of Professor Issacharoff that when the Supreme Court in Amchem 
rejected the use of class action settlements to resolve the asbestos litigation 
 
 147.  Id. at 492–93. 
 148.  John Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in 
the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1987). 
 149.  See Richard Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2003) 
(contrasting American procedural discretion with substantive discretion). 
 150.  Francis McGovern, Foreword to 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1990, at 1. In his 
biographical footnote, he noted that he had already served as “the special master who wrote the DDT 
allocation and distribution plan; one of three arbitrators who decided upon the implementing rules for 
the Manville Property damage claims resolution facility; an advisor to the bankruptcy court in the early 
stages of implementation of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust; and the court-appointed 
expert who drafted the UNR and Amatex claims resolution facilities in their respective bankruptcy 
courts.” Id. at n.*. 
 151.  Francis McGovern, Looking to the Future of Mass Torts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1022 (1995). 
 152.  Robert Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Toxic Harm Cases, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1037, 1040 (1995). 
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morass, “the proceduralists won hands down.”153 Turning to the rise of MDL 
mass tort litigation, consider Professor Gluck’s modulated approach: 
[A]cademics who complain that MDLs diminish access to court should confront the 
argument that, without MDLs, there might be substantially less access. . . . [I]t is striking 
to see . . . even Judith Resnik, one of the foremost critics of nontraditional case 
management . . . recognizing the access-to-court benefits of the MDL.154 
As Professor Tidmarsh, has recently noted: “Multidistrict litigation resolves 
transferred cases at a fraction of the cost of individual litigation.”155 
But it is hard to believe that this can work without fixers like Francis 
McGovern, who was once dubbed “St. Francis of Asbestos.”156 For the judges and 
the lawyers, he could make this process work. For the law professors, he could 
bring a nuanced eye to the multiple layers of theory and policy implicated. In 
many ways, he was unique. Though this Article does not probe deeply into the 
theoretical issues that deserve the sort of thorough inquiry not possible here, it 
does try to introduce the imperatives that made him such a critical player. We 
will all miss him. 
 
 
 153.  Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem 
and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (2002); see also Deborah Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos 
Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899 (2002) (raising questions about whether the 
Court’s decisions actually served the interests of most asbestos victims). 
 154.  Gluck, supra note 104, at 1696. 
 155.  Jay Tidmarsh & Daniela Peinado Welsh, The Future of Multidistrict Litigation, 51 CONN. L. 
REV. 769, 789 (2019). 
 156.  The opening lines of this editorial were: “We’re not sure if trial lawyers have a patron saint. But 
no man has a better claim to the title than Duke University law professor Francis McGovern.” Editorial, 
St. Francis of Asbestos, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2004), 
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